1. "What is your current assessment of the 'state' of transatlantic relations?"

The context of transatlantic relations is fundamentally different today from what it was before 1989. Thus the nature of the relationship has changed. So I don’t think it is appropriate to judge it by the standards of 1960s, 1970s, or even 1980s. This is one reason why I disagree with Dr. Kissinger’s assessment that the condition of the transatlantic relationship is the worst in memory. What has changed? Clearly the security context of the relationship and nature of the security challenges we face. Also, globalization brings us into closer contact and means we share an increasingly smaller global space, creating more points of friction as well as (viewed more positively) opportunities for cooperation. What have not changed are the fundamental values and perceptions of Americans and Europeans, which have always been both similar and different (I don’t agree that the recently much-discussed values gap between the US and Europe is anything particularly new; culture doesn't change all that quickly). In the current context, the differences tend to be more noticeable and emphasized.

2. "Do you think that the next decade will bring positive news in the two 'historical' pillars of the US-EU relations: security and trade?"

I don’t foresee, sadly, much likelihood of improvement in the relationship over the next decade, although it is always difficult to predict what will happen (After all, who predicted 1989, let alone September 11?). The nature of trade and economic relations have not changed all that much since the 1980s, with the exception of the Euro’s introduction and its potential consequences for American monetary and financial hegemony. Trade conflicts will continue to erupt, but these have always been a part of transatlantic relations. The extent of economic interdependence between the US and Europe is simply too great (and growing), and I believe that there is a strong mutual interest in preventing the relationship from deteriorating on this front.

The main divergence is occurring on the security side of things, with the US and Europe viewing the new threat of global terrorism in fundamentally different ways. For the US, this is a challenge to security and sovereignty that approximates the cold war challenge of communism, while in Europe it is viewed with much less alarm. Thus, while the US is willing to re-orient its security strategies and structures to confront this new challenge, and wishes to mobilize its European allies to do the same, Europeans see little need to do so. This could all change, of course, if Europeans come to view themselves as equal targets of global terrorism to the US. Given the strength of current views on this basic security question on both sides of the Atlantic, I don’t see the emergence of a new security consensus anytime soon. NATO could be the victim.

3. "Being the two richest and most democratic areas on the planet, do you think that both the EU and the US societies face a special responsibility regarding globalization on the
one hand; and on the other hand, do you think that they will face a growing number of similar challenges in their way towards the next decades? Should the transatlantic relationship be improved?"

Despite the current problems in the transatlantic relationship, I believe that American and European basic interests remain, in objective terms, very similar. Both the US and Europe are major centers of democracy and the global market economy. Both have an overriding interest in the continued survival and spread of democracy and human rights, as well as the effective functioning of the global market economy. This is the bottom line, although there may be different views about how best to realize these goals. Because of these shared basic interests, as well as the combined power and wealth of the US and Europe, the transatlantic relationship remains the primary basis for global cooperation to resolve pressing political, economic, and social problems. This is why the relationship is so important and valuable, and worth working to preserve and strengthen.

The main problem in transatlantic relations at present is not a divergence of interests, but a deteriorating tone in the relationship -- highly noticeable, but not so tangible. There seems to be a decline in affect ional ties between Europe and America, the almost instinctive empathy for each other that marked previous eras. Perhaps this is where organizations like TIES, with its commitment to improving society-society contacts, can make a contribution. Ironically, however, the transatlantic relationship in the future may need to be based more on cold calculations of interest and less on emotional solidarity. The deterioration in tone is borne of frustration on both sides: In Europe, frustration out of internal disorganization and impotence (especially in the political and security fields) and at not being taken seriously enough by the US; in the US, frustration at not being able to bend Europe to its will as easily as in the past, and at the declining hegemony of its worldview. Both sides will have to adjust to the new realities and context of their relationship, and try harder to reach common understandings.