Daan HUISINGA - Head of European Forward Studies Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands

"The US and the EU: the indispensable partnership"

Daan Huisinga
Forward Strategy Unit
Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Presentation for congress
"Reshaping Trans-Atlantic Relations for the 21st Century:
the Citizens' Perspective"
Miami, 14 - 16 November 2002

- unauthorised version; statements do not necessarily reflect those of the Netherlands Government -

Ladies and gentlemen, Europe owes a great deal to the US. Most of the post-war multilateral structures were partly or completely conceived and implemented under US leadership. It involved a mix of containment of the threat of communist dictatorship and promotion of open markets, democracy and the rule of law through global institutions such as the UN; the Bretton Woods institutions; GATT, which later became WTO; NATO and the CSCE.

In much the same way, European integration is the product of US foresight. There was little to suggest that Europe would rise like the phoenix from its ashes. Hatred, hunger, distrust and hostility had thrived for years and found plenty to feed on. Not a promising start for co-operation. However, having come to the rescue for the second time in 30 years, US leaders vowed to help create a Europe where national rivalries would never again lead to the sacrifice of their young soldiers. Generals George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower had seen first hand the destructive potential of nationhood in Europe. Marshall saw European integration as both precondition and product of his economic plan for the continent. In 1951, in a speech that set the tone of US policy for 50 years, Gen Eisenhower called for the establishment of a "workable European federation".

You know the rest: since the fifties, the EU moved from a Europe of coal and steel, via a farmers' Europe, an internal market Europe and a single currency Europe, towards what is now increasingly becoming a political Europe, an union with fifteen member states and common policies in areas ranging from environment to trade, justice and home affairs. It did this on its own strength, certainly, but in the background the benign influence of the US has always been present: how would German reunification would have looked like without the US, would there have been one? And how about the transition in Central and Eastern Europe? And would Turkey have ever reached the point of having been granted the status of EU candidate-state?

So we had a glorious 50+ years together; but do we also have a common future?

Reading the newspapers and magazines from both sides of the Atlantic, one is led to believe that the US and the EU are drifting apart. "It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world." This is a quote from a much-discussed article by Robert Kagan, titled "Power and Weakness" (published in June's edition of Policy Review). And he is not the only one with such strong statements. "Europe lacks moral fibre", I read on the frontpage of the Guardian newspaper when I boarded the airplane on my way to this congress.

These and similar reactions seem to be triggered by Europe's insistence that also after 911 the US should continue to embrace its multilateral commitments. Many American policy-makers, on the other had, see 911 as a watershed and consider the current period as the formative years of the war on terror, defining the newest world order.

However tempting, I won't go into the details of this discussion. Let me just say that the difference between Americans and Europeans is one of nuances, not of absolutes. We may differ on methods, but we have a common foundation based on shared values and principles. Moreover, the basic security concern is widely shared. Do not forget that Europe has plenty of experience with terrorism, also recently. And while we do not spend the US' one billion dollars per day on defence, we nevertheless manage to raise half-a-billion a day.

Furthermore, let me just put things into perspective by pointing out that the decoupling of the US and the EU has been predicted many times before, especially during Republican Presidencies. And at those times, the Transatlantic relation was quite often under considerable more strain than is now the case. Think of the anti-American demonstrations in Europe in relation with Vietnam, Central America and cruise-missiles.

The same applies to the recurring trade conflicts (steel, Foreign Sales Corporation, agricultural policies, bananas). I think it is save to say that these are in fact a normal by-product of an intense economic relationship amounting half of global GDP, 40% of the world's trade, and roughly 20-25% of each others' exports/imports.

And finally, as regards the increasingly important ethical and consumer-related issues (death penalty, abortion resp Genetically Modified Organisms, hormones in beef): these are normal phenomena in post-modern societies where people increasingly tend to look beyond their own national borders. The Netherlands for one can bear witness to this: our liberal policies on soft drugs and euthanasia are regularly and heavily critisised by some of our European partners.

Of course one essential difference is that following the end of the Cold War there is less of an imminent need to smooth over or restrain differences of opinion. But there are also more structural changes. New challenges mean that new demands are being made upon the transatlantic relationship.

First of all, the end of the Cold War permanently altered US global priorities. With the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989, the US vision of a united Europe was largely realised. Hence, the classical question of the transatlantic relationship - how do we keep the US involved in Europe's security - became less prominent. Of course it would be overly optimistic to say that all problems in the wider Europe of the OSCE have been solved. And surely the US presence in the Balkans remains of undisputed value. Yet it seems clear that the sources of instability in the 21st century are largely found outside Europe.

Secondly, the character of the global threat to peace and stability has drastically changed. There is no longer a clear and present danger to which one can respond in the form of nuclear deterrence and robust conventional capabilities. The threats we face today are at once more complex and more dispersed. Just as capital, goods, services and communication can move around the globe almost without being hindered by distance, so security and insecurity have become globalised. It is the dark side of globalisation to which we were vaguely aware, but which has become all too clear after 911: a borderless world through which things flow that we don't want to see flowing, be it terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, false documents or funds for terrorist activities. In combination with what has been labled "the revolt of the alienated" - the rise of religious fundamentalism - the consequences for security policies are profound.

Thirdly, the 'dark' list I mentioned can be further widened with phenomena such as the international drugs trade, trans-national crime syndicates, contagious diseases such as AIDS, the threat of information warfare, and so on.

Thirdly, and related: environmental issues such as climate change, water- and fisheries management and biodiversity.

Fourthly: failed nation-states. We can no longer wall ourselves off from the misery that accompanies this phenomenon. This is not only because CNN makes us a witness in our own homes, and because the victims increasingly turn up on our doorsteps, but also because these states have shown to become the breeding ground for terror, as was so clearly shown in Afghanistan. While before we were alarmed by state-sponsored terrorism; today our concern is with terrorist-sponsored states.

So how to respond to these formidable challenges?

One thing seems to be clear. It can't be done alone. Not even by the world's number one power. The US may loom large above all others, because of its unprecedented military, economic and cultural might, its political willingness to use this might, its focus on clear goals. But it is still not powerful enough to solve global problems like terrorism, environmental degradation and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For this it needs the help of others.
"If the US is bound to lead, it is also bound to co-operate" Joseph Nye writes. Unilateralism actually risks underming what Nye calls the US' soft power, the power it derives from the appeal of its culture, values and institutions. The US can cancel treaties, opt out of international regimes or refuse payment of UN membership fees much easier and with much more effect than other states. But if it wants to create peace it needs the peace-keeping capacity of the EU and other allies - yesterday in Bosnia, today in Kosovo, Macedonia and Afghanistan, tomorrow perhaps in Iraq. I suppose this is also what Henry Kissinger meant with his dictum that the "test of history for the US will be whether we can turn our current predominant power into international consensus and our own principles into widely accepted international norms". Nothing new, by the way, for Jefferson already spoke of "a decent Respect to pay due attention to the opinions of mankind".

The other side of the coin is anybody who wants to change the world for the better can only do so with American assent. Staying close to number one remains the number one strategic requirement for the American allies in Europe.

However, if the EU wants to harness American power as a force for good in the world, and one that keeps working within the parameters of the international institutions we so greatly value, we need to show more unity and determination. As Jean-Marie Soutou, former SG of the French MFA used to say "Europe gets the American partner it deserves."

The challenge is to introduce a new European sharpness and depth into what remains an essential relationship. The fear, sometimes heard, that our trans-Atlantic relations will be weakened if Europe is takes on more responsibility is baseless. In the ongoing process of globalisation, the Americans need Europe on their side, and vice versa. The point is that Europe needs to make a greater contribution and to take more responsibility, and that it should do so without undermining the cohesion of our partnership.

In the field of trade one can safely say that the more 'balanced relationship' we are striving for has already materialised. And also in the monetary field, after the launch of the euro, early this year, we're more and more becoming equals.

However, in the field of foreign policy realising the goal of a more equal and mature relationship will take some more time and effort. With the former Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, appointed as High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Europe finally has the one phone number to be called in case of crisis. And we are involved, actively, in all global foreign policy debates and issues.

But many questions remain to be answered. For instance regarding the scope and limits of our foreign and security policy. Does the EU want to shoulder the responsibility for every crisis on earth? Should our efforts be complementary or should we allow for some duplication?
It is imperative that we devise a common policy vision for European foreign relations and security in the coming years. We need to be able to decide when to commit troops, money or other instruments and when not to.

The answers to these and other questions will be not be forthcoming at once. Part of the answers will be given by the European Convention that is preparing a review of the European Treaties, part by the IGC (that will do the actual review), and part by the successive European Councils. Those who've been following the Convention will know that some helpful suggestions for improvements have already been put on the table: more power for Solana, more continuity in chairmanship, more decision making by qualified majority, more coherence with the Union's economic instruments, etc.

All of this will take time. We are not one nation, like the US. It is difficult to agree and then to execute a single policy between 15 countries, soon to be 25. On the one hand, we are well aware that we should act together in a globalising world. On the other hand, the reach of Brussels' is now so close to the heart of our national sovereignty, that many back away from institutional change. Certainly the US knows that an independent Foreign Policy goes to the heart of what it means to be nation. Still, I have no doubt that the EU will find a way forward. It always has.

In the meantime, the considerable contribution that the EU makes to the 'soft' side of foreign policy should not be overlooked. The EU shoulders more than half of all international aid and two-thirds of all grant aid. This is three times more than the US (25.4 million USD vs 9.6). To quote Jim Dobbins (State Dpt): "the Americans kick in the door and the Europeans pick up the pieces". From the Balkans to Afghanistan a practical division of tasks has grown, whereby the US does most of the initial warfare and the EU takes care of peacekeeping and reconstruction (although one should not underestimate the contribution of European special forces during operations such as Enduring Freedom). This division of tasks actually quite well suits each others capacities and comparative advantages. But, as I've pointed out, it is clear that in the long term, this is not a sustainable basis for a healthy, equal transatlantic relationship.

Ladies and gentlemen, let me conclude. I hope to have shown you today that the US and the EU are indispensable partners. Going alone is no option, we must act together. We share a responsibility for the world's security, prosperity and stability. Together, we can do and achieve more. We share a common perspective, even if we sometimes disagree. If not on security issues, than on environmental or economic ones. To some, it may appear that when one issue is out of the way, another takes its place. But look at it this way: as part of a mature relationship between two partners. A relationship in which we must be honest. The EU and the US have a strong bond forged in history. We may differ on some points, but we have a common foundation based on shared values and principles. And there is no monopoly on wisdom.

The EU and the US share an interest in promoting international peace and stability, democracy, the rule of law and free markets. We can and must work together, using the instruments and structures at our disposal: the NATO, the EU and bilateral relations.

The EU is maturing, venturing into foreign and security policy and bringing aboard new members. This will enable it to make a more active contribution to the world order in partnership with the US. That is really what our European efforts are all about: helping to prevent conflict.

The EU's common foreign and security policy is about stability, much as the EU itself is about stability and about the pursuit of common interests and values. That has been its 'raison d'être' from the beginning. It is also what influences our external policies, whether they concern defence and security, development assistance or economic and humanitarian aid to regions outside our borders.

The real test for the EU's foreign and security policy is its success in promoting our shared interests and values. I am confident that with European Security and Defence Policy to support and complement NATO and with the tools and the assertiveness that the EU is now developing, we will succeed in making Europe and the world a better place.

The US and the EU need to continue to form a global partnership. The Atlantic relationship is of paramount importance. We need each other, the world needs us. If we work together, great things can be accomplished.

Thank you.