“There
are no permanent alliances,
only permanent interests”
Lord Palmerston |
One
hundred and fifty years after his
death, Lord Palmerston
and his realistic statement remain
topical. Indeed, the American position
for several
months now, preferring ad hoc coalitions
over venerable U.N. and respectable
NATO, seems to confirm the Victorian
minister’s
lucidity. As a matter of fact, one thing
can be stated today—the distance
between the two Atlantic shores has widened.
Even more worrying, this transatlantic
unrest could be likely to damage the
Atlantic Alliance, the spearhead of the
relationship between the United States
and Europe since the end of World War
Two. It is thus legitimate to wonder
which turn the transatlantic link could
take by the year 2020, even though we
must admit that prediction is a dangerous
exercise. The most pessimistic observers
estimate that, within fifteen years,
the Alliance will have been broken up,
at best by “an amicable separation”,
at worst by “a bad divorce” (Kupchan,
2003). My own analysis rather leads
me to think that, in fifteen years,
the
transatlantic alliance will have
regained its vigor under the form
of a healthier
partnership than the twentieth-century
Alliance was. To be absolutely convincing this vision
must be based on a thorough examination
of this Alliance sealed in the aftermath
of the Second World War. Such an analysis
brings us to distinguish between fundamental
causes and formal causes.
Fundamental causes consist in the various
factors which, because they come within
the very nature of the transatlantic
partners, lead to an Alliance.
Thus, in the preamble to the Treaty of Washington, the countries which were
signatories reasserted their faith in “democracy, individual liberties,
and the supremacy of law”. To these common values, a wide spectrum of
common interests, ranging from the domain of security to economic interests,
can be added. However, without a common threat, the Communist threat, these
first two causes would not have required an alliance in 1949. Because of their
essential nature, the Alliance’s fundamental causes have endured up until
today. If values and interests have remained unchanged, the Communist threat,
however, has disappeared to a fundamentalist Islam that is as dreadful for
the transatlantic partners’ values and interests.
If fundamental causes amount to motivations, formal causes, for their part,
relate back to the Alliance as an object affected by the play of powers. And
it is precisely in these formal causes that the transatlantic crisis is rooted.
The Alliance has indeed been corrupt by two evolutions: the emergence of the
European Union (E.U.) and the misunderstandings that resulted from it. As a
matter of fact, after the war, the Europeans were exhausted and relied on the
U.S. to protect them from the Soviet Union. The balance of power between the
transatlantic partners was so unequal that the Europeans’ ended up depending
on the U.S. Nevertheless, this relationship of dependency was modified by the
structuring of the E.U., which, once the Communist threat was gone, aspired
to a greater autonomy on the military and strategic levels. This ambition was
received by Washington as a threat to the Atlantic Alliance and the American
interests in the region. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the U.S., determined
to remain a “European power” (Rice and Zelikow, 1995), has always
sought to preserve their position within NATO. This quiet struggle has thus
fed on a misunderstanding—the Europeans fearing that the U.S. should
hinder their ambition and the Americans taking offence at the lack of European
involvement in the Alliance.
The analysis of the formal causes to
the Alliance thus shows that the rot
had set in well before the war in Iraq.
The crisis only revealed the strength
and weaknesses of the Alliance.
Of course the cataclysm has exacerbated
the divisions within the Alliance. However,
it has also made obvious the persistence
of a transatlantic community.
For instance, twenty four hours after the drama of 9/11 and for the first time
in NATO’s history, article 5 was invoked, making all the allies standing
together. Even more eloquent were these French newspapers’ headlines: “Nous
sommes tous Américains” (We are all Americans). There can be no
doubt that 9/11 has revived the sense of a community of values, interests,
and fate among the allies. However, 9/11 has also triggered a crisis that reached
its climax with the debate over Iraq. From then on, the U.S., whose hegemony
was denounced by the Europeans, gave in to the unilateral temptation. In Afghanistan,
they invoked logistic reasons while, in Iraq, the Bush administration took
the lead of a coalition of the willing—a manifest sign of the failure
of the collective security’s concept. This behavior raised skepticism
among Europeans.
However, the current situation leads us to think that the remedy to the transatlantic
crisis lies at the very core of the crisis itself and that, through a process
of “fecund destruction”, it could bring about the conditions for
a new relationship between the U.S. and Europe, a true partnership between
the two shores of the Atlantic. Let us explain our view. 9/11 marked a historic
turning point in that the terrorist attack challenged the American nation to
reevaluate its national and geopolitical interests, among others. If, on the
eve of the attack, one could believe that Europe remained central to the U.S.
security concerns, the tragedy has diffused all the doubts. Since 9/11, American
policies have focused on the Middle East, pointed out as the cradle of fundamentalist
Islam. If this loss of interest generates a sense of frustration in Europe,
it also releases the E.U. from the American chaperoning. And, as a matter of
fact, since 2001, despite the divisions over Iraq, the E.U. has moved forward
in the domain of defense. Besides defining a plan of joint action to struggle
against proliferation, we can stress the adoption of a common European security
strategy initiated by Javier Solana. It endeavors to circumscribe threats and
envision effective solutions. And finally, as far as capacities are concerned,
the E.U. has also made progress—the first “tactical groups” will
be operational in 2007 and extended by more common capacities by 2020. Thus,
the transatlantic crisis has untied partners but could well, in the end, favor
a new cooperation in which the European shore will be stronger and more involved.
To
those who see this untying as a new
enduring set-up testifying to the
American “superpower” and
the European inability, I respond that
the U.S. and the E.U. need each other
too much. Thus, the crisis at the U.N.,
the resort to an ad hoc coalition, a
mock multilateralism, or the organization
of an international conference on Iraq,
constitute as many signs of the American
need for legitimacy—a need that
only multilateralism can convey. Reversely,
Europe, even if it is on its way towards
becoming responsible, remains attached
to the U.S. to guarantee its security.
This is even more so since ten new countries,
which are very Atlanticist, entered the
E.U. These considerations, combined with
the community of values and interests
that has already been noted, brings us
to think that, in 2020, there will still
be a transatlantic link.
More than that, this relationship will
be healthier because it will correspond
to everyone’s realities and aspirations. Mainly defensive in 1949, the
2020 Alliance will be elective and will take the form of a partnership based
on the mutual recognition of each partner’s capacities. Thus, nothing
prevents us from imagining a distribution of the tasks according to everyone’s
know-how. The E.U., resenting an extreme militarization, now moves towards
the development of a preemptive involvement, a European “soft power” combining
diplomacy, fast deployment, police operations, and humanitarian or economic
assistance. Mrs. Rice should feel reassured, if American soldiers are not here “to
escort children to kindergarten”, the Europeans, on the contrary, would
gladly do it. Recently, European strategy against nuclear proliferation in
Iran was a great success, which cannot but satisfy the U.S. We would like to
think that the two conceptions of collective security which are opposed today
could collaborate tomorrow in a partnership which would dissipate yesterday’s
frustrations and misunderstandings. To the American pillar could correspond
a true European pillar, based on a particular approach, specific tools and
methods. One thing remains to be determined: the framework for the implementing
of the cooperation. From this point of view, we might as well not try to predict
NATO’s future, an organization which was often declared hopelessly ill
and which proved it could survive its own reason to be. Everything will depend
on its ability to reflect both partners’ evolutions and necessities.
Now that it is time to conclude this
work, my concern for meticulousness brings
me to indicate the conditions for my
vision to be realized. It is two-fold
and concerns both partners. On one hand,
this vision demands that the E.U. should
pursue its integration process, which
is most likely. On the other hand, it
requires an American appeasement through
which prudence should win over fear,
action over reaction, and realism over
ideology. Can we bet on American pragmatism?
Let us hope so.
Alexandre Perra
Translated
from French by : Marie Beauchamp.
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