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The
precedents of "improvement through failure"
exist
Jacques
Poos, then Foreign Affairs Minister of Luxembourg, famously
announced at the outbreak of hostilities in the then
Yugoslavia that "this is the hour of Europe".
Expectations were high of an EU approach to solve the
problem. The result was a debacle, with public opinion
horrified at the ever worsening massacres, and European
countries visibly divided in
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The
same happened again with Kosovo. Despite reluctance
on the part of some Member States, it was agreed to
intervene, even in the absence of a UN mandate. Expectations
were high of the EU playing a leading role. The reality
was otherwise: the US dominated the campaign and the
peace, and this simply because our bombers were not
equipped with accurate enough weapons systems. Even
though the political resolve had been found, the military
means were lacking. In the depths of this trough, Member
States resolved never to be caught out again: hence
the commitment to build military capabilities, and even
a 60,000 strong military Rapid Reaction Force.
The
warning from economics
The
equivalent in economic theory is the, the J-Curve effect.
This explains how the devaluation of a country's currency
(something that should boost its exports by making its
products cheaper to buy abroad) may initially make the
balance of
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For the EU, the hope must therefore be that the short
term crisis caused by Iraq, which has led to both devalued
credibility and no positive return on the "balance
of integration" can now be turned around to something
more positive.
The warnings for the EU after Iraq are, however, similar
to the warnings applicable with economic theory. To
start with, currency devaluation is of itself no remedy
to lack of competitiveness. If there are fundamental
reasons why the domestic economy was uncompetitive (low
productivity, high wage claims, lack of innovation,
etc.) a devaluation will only give a temporary breathing
space before these problems return.
In
the case of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy,
the analogy is direct. The EU's repeated inability to
respond to crises can be viewed as successive "devaluations"
of it its Foreign Policy credibility. Just as with a
country's currency, the more often it is devalued, the
more often others in the world expect it to be devalued
again. Given that a hefty part of diplomatic weight
depends on credibility, this repeated devaluation is
extremely damaging abroad and at home. Even if each
time baby steps to "improving efficiency"
have been taken, these are not enough to guarantee that
future crises will not again cause splits.
Grappling with the real issues
As
with the European economy, our Foreign policy needs
fundamental structural reform. The problem is clear:
with 15 (or 17 if you count the Commission and Council
Secretariat) different Foreign Offices, one inevitably
has 15+ different foreign policies. Given that they
are not about to be abolished, the best that can be
achieved is to:
i)
establish exactly what are the EU's common vital interests
that all Member States should together promote;
ii) network
the Foreign and Security establishments so as each is
so thoroughly penetrated by staff of all other
Member States that there can be no secrets left from
each other;
iii) harmonize
major Standard Operating Procedures and specialise the
defence establishments to such a degree
that no single EU army could operate without the back-up
of its fellow Member States.
The
creation of a super foreign minister envisaged by the
Convention is a nice extra, but frankly will not address
the fundamental issues if Member States cannot be brought
to understand the perspectives of their fellows elsewhere.
This, more than anything else, requires the human exchanges
of understanding brought by the three points raised
above, and especially a process that is not the diplomatic
tradition of reading long speeches to each other, but
rather a genuine and candid dialogue building common
understanding.
Conclusion
The
EU can use the Iraq crisis to build for the future.
The pressure brought by its failure can be used productively.
However, the time is nearing where the devaluation of
its policy is so great that all credibility is lost.
Action is urgent, but not in the Treaties where the
experts are again looking, but rather on the practical
level of mutual understanding between officials. We
are in the nadir of the J curve. It is all up-hill from
here...
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