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Building the Transatlantic Bridge
by Brian Murphy: Co-Director, EU Center Univ. System of Georgia, (Sam Nunn Scholl of Int. Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology)
28/02/2003

The transatlantic relationship is currently under its greatest strain since the end of World War II. At this critical moment, we need to focus on what works: the transatlantic economic connection. It is the glue that holds the partnership together. At the same time, we must ensure that a bridge is built that links the two societies in order to escape the failed diplomacy taking place through official channels. The deepening of interaction at the civil society level is the second component of healing the transatlantic divide.
The networking of civil society would promote a common agenda across the Atlantic that is defined by the priorities from the public at-large. Cross-fertilization is needed to replace the absence of genuine joint discussion. If achieved, governments would be held to the same standards and, in the process, a foundation would be established supporting transatlantic harmony. According to Felix Phillipp, "A fundamental premise underlying the joint transatlantic inquiry into the civil society and communitarian concepts is the notion that societies which are based on similar ideas of value, and which have similar social, welfare, and democratic procedures and structures will tend to be prepared to defend these values and structures jointly." The New Transatlantic Agenda, an agreement signed in 1995, launched several "bridge-building" dialogues-such as for consumers, the environment, labor, and business-but most failed to survive their infancy. In simple terms, they were never supported at the official levels and had no influence. These initiatives must be energized and given meaningful access to governmental policy-makers.
A strengthened civil society bridge is also vital in light of the increased amount of transatlantic economic activity. A European Union with a unified (or nearly so) monetary system means that the calculus must be revised under which the transatlantic partnership has functioned to date. As the EU emerges from the shadow of the U.S., the economic playing field must be better balanced to reflect the interests of both parties. The existing structures, it is safe to conclude, are tarnished by obsolete assumptions and flawed methods. Change, drastic on some fronts, is inevitable.
The shortcomings of the transatlantic economic zone are mired in defects of the policy process. The agenda is too dominated by trade disputes. Both the EU and U.S. have sought to score domestic political victories at the expense of sound economic strategies. Each uses the WTO more often to appease local lobbies than to establish fundamental principles of how trade should flow most efficiently and fairly. Distortion in trade is the consequence as the system is brought to its knees for the sake of temporary and largely meaningless deference to constituents. Congress, and recently the European Parliament, are interfering to inject parochial concerns into trade disputes. It is the triumph of politics over principle in its most naked form.
Patterns of investment, mergers, and networking are countervailing forces to the factors provoking discord in the transatlantic axis. Mutual self-interest, in simple terms, is a buffer to some of the tendencies stirring economic and even political combat. What must be realized is that problems, ranging from pensions to employment conditions, will become elements of a shared agenda as a matter of course. This means that closer coordination on regulatory matters will surface as a transatlantic priority to resolve. The difficulty is finding an acceptable ground for compromise. Since the EU and U.S. have different attitudes toward the tolerable scope of regulatory intervention, the framework for a settlement will be a hard bargain to negotiate. A long period of friction should be anticipated before greater synchronization is achieved.
The civic and economic areas should become increasingly intertwined in the transatlantic partnership. The alternative would be the evolution of competing and hostile blocs. The seeds of the former are already planted and should bear fruit if properly tended. After all, it is economics-not security or culture-that constitutes the bond holding together the transatlantic alliance. The incentive of self-interest should prevail.


From Globalization to Global Organization:
Is There An EU-US Convergence?

Globalization is a challenge and an opportunity that must be managed with sensitivity to regional interests to prevent fracturing world stability into competing camps. We have suffered from the premature legalization of organizations and invested them with extraordinary power. The transatlantic matrix, for better or worse, will decide the long-term implications of globalization. In this context, the panelists tackled four questions:
" Will sufficient convergence exist in the transatlantic alliance to enable the effective operation of transnational organizations?
" Will institutional reform of transnational organizations occur to the extent necessary to offset criticisms of elite dominance, insensitivity to alternative avenues of globalization, and policy incoherence?
" Can the transatlantic partnership avoid disintegration into hostile competitors as the EU emerges in economic strength to a level of parity with the US?
" Will the organizational structure of the EU be improved enough to administer the monetary union as well as any additional steps toward economic integration?
A globalized economy requires institutions that work in concert. Today, policies are decided by institutions-like the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization-that are confined to their own field of responsibility. Under this model, the EU and US cope with the effects of globalization rather than provide a direction to changes in an orderly and consistent fashion. The policy agenda is being set without effective management or uniformity in goals. In addition, the democratic voice is not finding expression in the process and the implication is being drawn that globalization is orchestrated by elite manipulation.
This same indictment applies to the EU more specifically as the administration of Europe (EU, national, and regional) has been outpaced by global transformation. Hierarchical organization has become obsolete in the face of monetary union, impending enlargement, and possible political deepening within the next two decades. The European administrative arrangement would operate more logically if based on function (EU function, national function, regional function) rather than on level of government. Present institutional deadlocks are indeed partly a result of Europe's failure to move from the pyramid mode (organized in hierarchical levels in which the skills gained by one are lost by another) to the networking mode (organized in functions in which roles are complementary and enable a positive end-result).
Setting up the European administrative network would depend on the formation of units within each ministry that answer directly to government leaders. These units would be charged with overseeing sector-based networks (such as EuroPol and Eurojust) and their personnel would be hired on the basis of professional skills explicitly for careers in European administration. The Commission would play the role of "network leader," providing concept integration, common proposals, and respect for common rules. Bureaucrats across Europe would interact in a horizontal or parallel configuration, ensuring accountability and efficiency in a template that unifies the continent.
This method of organization could be exported on a transatlantic or even global scale. The catalog of problems introduced by globalization are exceeding the grasp of the traditional nation-state to handle. Solutions defy unilateral approaches when confronted by environmental degradation, cross-border crime, and meandering financial flows that are difficult to track. "One logical consequence of this development," according to Curt Gasteyger of the Institut Universitaire de Haute Etudes, Internationales in Geneva, "is the rise of a great variety of non-governmental actors within the policy-making community." Closer global cooperation is, at least in theory, the outcome. This benefit has not materialized to the extent anticipated because the politics of national self-interest have hamstrung the capacity of transnational organizations to fulfill their lofty commitments. Despite predictions to the contrary, the demise of the nation-state has been exaggerated and this situation is not likely to change in the future for the simple reason that no other authority will have the legitimacy to enforce policy. The paradox is that problems defy national competence and nations constitute the hurdle to effective administration.
The engine of globalization is the liberalized economy driven by new technology. This economy is responsible for the rapid integration of markets. Poorer countries, nonetheless, are not in a position to avail themselves of the opportunities presented by globalization and this legacy is a moral imperative to be dealt with by the transatlantic alliance over the next twenty years. If anything, globalization has aggravated the income disparity between affluent and poorer nations. The conditions imposed by transnational organizations for loans and other aid have not always improved the lives of the average worker and citizen in the recipient nations. The market model being exported as the "one size fits all" solution has wrought disastrous outcomes, particularly in Russia. This calls into question Martin Wolf's recent conclusion that "(g)lobalization is not destined, it is chosen." What is the alternative for an impoverished nation? Globalization cannot be ignored and it is marching to the tune drummed by transnational organizations.
Clearly, institutional reform is warranted if the backlash against globalization is to be muted and its raw edges made less cruel. The methods of dispute settlement must change. A host of factors must be considered. Most important, a greater respect for diversity in the path toward globalization must be tolerated by transnational organizations. As countries move toward increased specialization, different economic prescriptions must be accorded more latitude. In addition, basic governmental tasks like taxation will become more difficult in the fluid exchange among nations. Countries acting independently will lack the resources and enforcement capabilities to control many essential functions in the absence of a multilateral cooperative framework. Lines of authority will become further obscured in areas like crime and social services where national responsibilities overlap. These factors combine to compel transnational organizations to reinvent themselves to maintain relevance to future needs. They are both the solution and the problem. The question is how to accomplish this makeover while balancing the competing interests of labor versus management, rich versus poor nations, and democratic input versus efficiency.
Since the nation-state is unlikely to wither away or even diminish, it must be incorporated as the building-block of the transnational approach to global management. It is at this point that the networking strategy is an appropriate mechanism. Functional lines should be established at the nation-state level and linked with the transnational organizations. This process will enable democratic input into the policy-making sequence. It does not mean nation-states should determine policy but only contribute feedback. Otherwise, politics will intrude where technical standards should prevail. While a system of mandatory consultation should be a prerequisite to transnational administration, such a step alone is not enough since global management would be a patchwork of isolated organizations acting without a coherent blueprint. To avoid the negative stigma of global government, an annual strategic plan with broad objectives should be prepared by a forum representing nations equally, such as in the context of the United Nations. The transnational organizations would merely implement the objectives consistent with their mandates.
The transatlantic relationship will be the pivotal influence in the transnational process of the future. Collaboration in defining mutually acceptable positions will make the process perform in a smooth but also advantageous manner. The danger, from a global perspective, is that the shared weight of these two giants could skew transnational management in a direction that is detrimental to the non-Western world, placing other countries in an almost subservient status. The likelihood of transatlantic hegemony, however, is unrealistic since the amount of harmony required is beyond plausible attainment. What should be attempted is a method of dialogue on functional lines with the condition that consequences are binding on a set of discrete matters. The participation of legislators and interest groups, for example, would render substance and a democratic spirit into the process. Some step of this kind is important to prevent the transnational model from being contorted by disputes and frustrated by deadlock. Instead of hegemony, the real future peril is division of the transatlantic partnership into contending economic blocs. Standstill and global economic warfare would be the result. Transatlantic convergence will serve the world better than divergence.
Globalization is an opportunity that must be managed correctly. The transatlantic relationship will determine whether the ill tendencies currently manifested will be reversed or at least curtailed.

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