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THE DIPLOMATIC CHESSBOARD: WHO MOVES FIRST?
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by
Brian Murphy:
Co-Director, EU Center Univ. System of Georgia, (Sam Nunn
Scholl of Int. Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology)
18/04/2003 |
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At the fall of the Berlin Wall, then-President George Bush
announced the inauguration of a "New World Order."
However, the end of the Cold War failed to produce a clear
geo-political policy or strategy after more than a decade.
This situation is understandable because many traditional
moorings broke loose and the flux never resolved itself into
a stable enough political environment to build guiding doctrine.
As former Israeli Prime Minister Simon Perez stated, "When
you lose your enemy, you lose your foreign policy." Without
a compass, responses to international events became little
more than reflexive reactions determined by what needed to
be accomplished immediately to restore equilibrium.
The crisis in Iraq
is the catalyst signaling an impending shift in the international
architecture that will be drawn to reflect a different global
context. The likely end-game of the crisis is a reshuffling
in the pattern of alliances and a restructuring in the framework
of multi-lateral organizations. It is an important moment
to make clear-headed political decisions because a generation
or more is at stake. Due to economic prowess and military
capabilities, the transatlantic relationship constitutes the
focal point that will define future global fault lines. As
Werner Weidenfeld, Director of the Center for Applied Policy
Research in Munich, bluntly concluded: "[W]hat is happening
is the disintegration of the stabilizers and filters ... that
used to provide collective orientation for the 'West.'"
The current mix of national priorities and leadership egos
is a volatile combination that defies easy analysis.
The major players
are engaged in a multi-level game of chess in which it is
too early to predict how pieces will be moved. Yet at least
some of the logic can be anticipated. It begins with President
George W. Bush. His actions in Iraq were motivated out of
a sincere commitment to improve conditions in the Middle East
and to protect his vision of U.S. national security. Bush's
assumptions and approach can be questioned but his intentions
were almost certainly not of a sinister sort. He was propelled
along by circumstances put into motion by 9/11 rather than
by a hidden agenda to convert the world to the American gospel.
The initial decision after Afghanistan was whether to concentrate
against small but genuine terrorist targets, such as in the
Philippines or Yemen, or to send a broader message by eliminating
a high profile regime. Iraq made sense because it was vulnerable
diplomatically, had a demonic leader, and would galvanize
the American public in a way the other options could not.
Most important, the insertion of democracy in the midst of
the Arab world was a cherished goal of several key advisors
to Bush.
It cannot be denied
many in Europe believe that Iraq is the first step in a long-range
U.S. plan to model the world to mirror the American image.
Some in the Bush Administration hardly conceal such lofty
ambitions. Nonetheless, a blueprint of this magnitude is simply
not feasible to implement by unilateral fiat. First, American
resources are already being stretched too thin by the simultaneous
commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since neither country
can be exited in the foreseeable future, new military obligations
must be scaled back within reasonable parameters. In simple
terms, the U.S. may be equipped to bomb again but it would
be hard pressed to maintain another occupation. Imperial overreach
is a powerful antidote to unilateral aspirations. Second,
the American public has rarely tolerated military adventurism
for a sustained period. Public opinion was supportive in removing
the "evil" Saddam Hussein largely because the legend
of his atrocities had been publicized for a decade prior to
any military action. No single tyrant, save Osama bin Laden,
could be sold to the public without risking a backlash that
transcends social and political divisions. Third, an election
is looming in a little over one year. The weak economy cannot
continue to be assigned to the second tier and, in its place,
military drums kept beating out danger warnings for nineteen
more months. In the absence of a significant terrorist episode,
history should caution President Bush to change the theme
of his administration in order to survive in office. Fourth,
the damage to international organizations has to be repaired
to prevent what could become the chronic tarnishing of the
U.S. reputation abroad. According to reports, President Bush's
own father has been critical of the way in which the multi-lateral
process has been abused. This so-called "caveman"
mentality, in the words of EU High Representative Javier Solana,
will undermine U.S. credibility in international forums. Cooperation
must be exhibited by operating within sanctioned channels
to escape branding as an international piranha. In summary,
the ability of President Bush to maneuver after Iraq is less
flexible than might appear to be the case following a military
victory.
Surprisingly, the
moral high ground claimed by France, Germany and Russia could
be even less secure. French President Jacques Chirac clearly
aspires to catapult France into a position of international
stature not warranted by the country's resources or assets.
To compensate, he has sought to establish alliances with Germany
and Russia but these are built on shaky foundations. Chirac's
initial tactic was to rejuvenate the dormant French-German
axis within the European Union (EU). This rapprochement was
complicated by his history of personal animosity with German
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, a strain worsened by Chirac's
unconcealed preference for Schröder's challenger in last
year's election in Germany. Since opposition to the U.S. position
on Iraq played well domestically, both buried hostility for
the sake of mutual political advantage. The justifications
produced by President Bush made disagreement on Iraq easier
for the two leaders but they pushed their position beyond
principled criticism to the point of uncompromising confrontation.
Any chance of negotiation was ruined in the wake. Vladimir
Putin, President of Russia, was slower in joining the "rival
pole" but he sensed an opportunity to leverage EU support
on issues vital to the interests of his country, notably on
visa-free access to Kaliningrad and silence over brutality
in Chechnya. His alignment was designed to purchase rewards
on these delicate matters despite a closer political orbit
with the U.S. in recent years.
Given this background,
the pieces are positioned on the chessboard. If the U.S. captures
the initiative by quickly calming international concerns over
its unilateral tendencies, President Bush could escape censure
even if weapons of mass destruction are not uncovered in Iraq.
Staying out of Syria and North Korea coupled with soothing
words in the United Nations would suffice for the interim.
The reason is that the rival pole is a partnership of convenience
in which value consensus extends little further than the priority
of constraining U.S. unilateralism. The web of temporary alliances
begins to unravel if the U.S. acknowledges a preference to
respect international rules. Such a step would enable German
business interests to prevail upon Schröder to overhaul
the connection with the U.S. as a necessary response to stimulate
an economy in deep recession. France and Russia surely cannot
help much in what matters most to Germany. Schröder is
already showing signs of fence mending by meeting with British
Prime Minister Tony Blair and promising to at least consider
deploying German peacekeeping troops in Iraq.
The Russian leg
of the alliance's triangle is equally as fragile because it
is implausible that Putin will obtain the concessions motivating
his overture to France and Germany. Once spurned, the U.S.
would welcome Putin's return to the fold if only for its strategic
relevance. In this scenario, France could experience the most
difficult transition in the post-Iraq world. As former European
Commission President Jacques Delors warned, Chirac has situated
France in a "diplomatic cul-de-sac" by taking opposition
to the U.S. to an excessive degree. Trapped in this vice,
Chirac has broken the stalemate by telephoning Bush and pledging
pragmatic cooperation on a case-by-case basis.
This means that
the UK could be placed in the unusual position of constituting
the bridge within the EU. It could be the centerpiece anchoring
a formidable bloc of current members (including Italy, Spain,
Denmark, the Netherlands, and possibly Germany) as well as
the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe who
demonstrate an emotional attachment to the U.S. The outcome
would be to preserve the Atlantic orientation of the EU as
dialogue turns to establishing better balance in the relationship.
As former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher commented,
"There is not too much America but not enough Europe."
If Bush acts in
a reverse fashion to maximize his unilateral options, on the
other hand, a new world order would culminate of unknown dimensions
and unproven alliances. We are at a precipice and must wait
for the first move to trigger a sequence that will shape the
world.
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