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Imploding From Within: The EU'S Foreign Policy Architecture
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by
Brian Murphy:
Co-Director, EU Center Univ. System of Georgia, (Sam Nunn
Scholl of Int. Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology)
10/06/2003 |
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In
theory, the lessons from the invasion of Iraq are coming in
a timely manner for the European Union as it debates a future
constitution that will define its structure, decision-making
procedures, and policies. Everything is on the table for revision
and that is good as the EU's flawed foreign policy architecture
experienced a collapse during the tense moments of the past
few months. This embarrassing failure of diplomacy should
be corrected if the EU is to have any stature in global forums.
As European Commission President Romano Prodi stated in Florence,
"Europe should have a role; saying that it should is
exaggerated because we are not yet united to speak with one
voice. But if Europe had a common goal, in these days it could
have a very big influence in the world scene. But instead,
we are being laughed at." Nonetheless, it is likely that
national self-interest will override any serious transformation
of a continent without leadership or unified leverage at the
international level.
The
problem is not rooted in popular opposition. A May 2003 poll-just
after the war in Iraq-found the European public committed
in a desire to obtain greater coherence in the EU's Common
Foreign and Security Policy. According to the Eurostat survey,
63 percent endorsed a common foreign policy while 71 percent
favored a common defense policy as well. These numbers, slightly
down from the previous year, reflect a willingness to submerge
national prerogatives in the interest of collective influence
on the world stage. This tendency is not shared by political
leaders who hesitate to relinquish independent control of
foreign policy for the straightjacket of lowest-common-denominator
diplomacy. The advantage of greater weight that must be shared
mutually is not enough to outweigh discretion in defending
national priorities. As an EU official complained at the height
of the Iraq crisis, "Nobody cared about Europe."
National self-interest will remain the engine of the EU's
foreign policy even after the constitutional revision is concluded,
ensuring an ineffective global presence.
Aside
from collective influence, it is difficult to identify what
benefits would accrue to larger member states in the EU from
a genuine common foreign policy. In the opinion of Stuart
Eizenstat, former U.S. ambassador to the EU, "The principal
member states are not willing to relinquish their prerogatives.
... As long as this remains the case, the European Union will
not develop a diplomatic and political weight commensurate
with its economic and commercial strength." While the
smaller member states have little reluctance in ceding additional
authority to the EU since they would acquire at least some
voice in international affairs in return, the larger states
would be assigned the unfamiliar status of secondary players.
The exchange is hardly an attractive bargain for the autonomy
that would be forfeited only to become marginalized in the
process.
In
foreign policy terms, the EU was not a factor in persuading
the United States to amend its approach toward Iraq. Yet neither
were any of the member states. A harmonized EU, on the other
hand, might have possessed the capability to make a significant
difference. American unilateralism might be caused as much
by the EU's internal deficiencies than by U.S. preference.
Quite clearly, there is no credible partner with which to
negotiate. This situation is not about to change. In its current
draft, the EU's constitution requires member states to do
no more than to "support the Union's common foreign and
security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty
and mutual solidarity." Failure is the inevitable outcome.
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