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Forget about healing transatlantic wounds; now it's about building a new partnership
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by
Franck Biancheri:
President of TIESWEB and Director for Studies and Strategy of Europe 2020.
15/04/2003 |
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Current Iraq/UN crisis between Europeans and Americans have clashed
with deeply rooted European trends and will generate long
term consequences
Whatever
some would like to believe on both sides of the Atlantic,
the consequences of the Iraq/UN crisis will have long,
sustainable consequences. What they embody is the end
of the post WWII order which first big crack was the fall
of the Iron Curtain in 1989. In many ways, current Iraq/UN
crisis will generate effects of the same magnitude: the
US led 'West Side Story'.
Of
course at first sight, everything looks completely different,
if not opposed: on the one hand, we had a crumbling Empire,
defeated by its inability to move forward and adapt itself
to this finishing XXth century socio-economic conditions;
on the other hand, we have what is commonly described
as the only, or the last, 'super-power', seemingly at
the perigee of its might. How comes that these two events
could be in any way the two faces of the same coin?
Empires
are XXIst century political dinosaurs
Well,
simply because of something called History, passing time,
transitory nature of human glory (Sic Transit Gloria Mundi),
all these things which powers of all sorts in History
have learnt to learn
by force
Because nothing
lasts forever
Because there is no such thing as
the end of History
Because one of the most fragile
political structures on Earth is
the Empire. About
this last point, it is extremely interesting to look at
the duration of empires in the past 2 centuries: obviously
their life expectancy is not anymore going beyond a century,
if not just a few decades. Europe was the first place
where empires learnt that their time had passed. Europe
was first hit by this fact in the XXth century and empires
as well as dreams of eternal might had to vanish (though
they did it at a very heavy cost in terms of death and
destruction). Most likely this fact will also affect the
rest of the world in the coming decades. Let's hope destruction
and death will be more limited than in European history
Many
reasons to the progressive disappearing of those political
dinosaurs called 'Empires', of course. One may be the
simple fact that we now live in a full world: full of
people, full of information, full of common problems and
challenges. Those huge machineries that empires are (bureaucratic
machineries combined with a political power always closely
connected to religion and God) seem to have become unable
to deal with the growing complexity of modern societies
(inside and with the rest of the world). Their own management
progressively becomes a fight in itself, a fight for who
will control the empire. A 'power bubble' where the rest
of the world and all other issues are only seen in terms
of 'rapport de forces' within this 'bubble'. Such 'power
bubbles' do emerge regularly in centralistic systems where
power is concentrated in a precise city/region, like in
Washington today.
The
Europeans are facing challenges far more important to
them and the rest of the world, than preservingUS power
on top
But
how does that affect transatlantic relations? Well in
two very simple ways:
-
Though they agree to the importance of transatlantic
relations, a growing number of Europeans, in particular
among upcoming generations, do not share the assumption
that the US will be anymore in the future able to lead
by itself the so-called 'West', in particular its EU/US
component, because they see it as a declining empire
trying to rely on might to keep afloat of its own problems.
-
The Europeans in many ways have fought successfully
in the past decade against the threat of the emerging
of such a 'power bubble' at the core of the European
construction process. In many ways, Brussels was tempted
to take such a path in the early 90s, after the Fall
of the Berlin Wall and the successful implementation
of the Single Market. I remember top Commission officials
at that time telling me: 'We are now the principal force
shaping up Europe'. It also reminds me telling them
that with a bit of candid analysis they would see that
they were a very isolated bunch of people in need for
long lasting political support, i.e. rooted in democratic
forces (or police and military forces, which they did
not control). We all know what happened to this idea
in the past decade. Today the Europeans are starting
to understand that they are on the verge of a major
historical challenge, which implications are going much
further than the boundaries of the European continent:
they are coping with the problems of shaping up a 500
millions citizens, multicultural, multilingual democracy.
A challenge nobody ever faced in European or Human history
before. A challenge which, if successfully met, will
definitely complete the European peace process started
by the European Community founders after WW II; but
also a challenge which could lead to major breakthrough
regarding global issues ranging from other continental
integrations processes such as in Asia, Africa, Latin
America,
and also to Global Governance challenges
which will be on top of the agenda for all of us all
along XXIst century.
These
are the deep European trends that current transatlantic
struggles on Iraq and UN issues have clashed with. It
explains why the consequences will be long lasting. It
simply puts now in the open trends which were there for
about a decade or so and where buried under assumptions
coming from 1945.
The
US is a European dream as much as European unity is an
American dream: but now a new context emerges
In
many ways, the US is a European dream as much as European
unity is an American dream. The point today is that the
dominant American dream about America is looking like
a European nightmare; while the European dream about Europe
is looking like an American competitor. It defines the
new context in which transatlantic relations will have
to be pursued in the coming decades.
It says all the obstacles which are going to be in the
way of those who do think, as I am, that if we fail to
build a new constructive transatlantic partnership for
the XXIst century then, the world will be unable to solve
many of its problems.
But those who are serious about building a long lasting
EU/US partnership have to be candid about the new situation
and its consequences. It is not about healing the wounds
created by this crisis.
It is on the contrary by getting deeper in what created
this crisis. It is not about being politically correct
and not calling problems by their names. It is on the
contrary by 'calling a cat, a cat' as we say in French.
It is not by being afraid to 'shock' the other side; but
on the contrary to say unpleasant things if we think that
they deserve being said. Of course this has to be made
with keeping in mind the overall objective of rebuilding
a new transatlantic partnership.
Therefore there is absolutely no place for names-calling,
country-bashing, hatred,
. There should be no place
for arguments which prevent discussions to move forward
by helping those involved to understand better the other's
position; but there should be all space made available
for ideas, opinions helping out to break the 'conviction
bubble' in which many players tend to dig themselves into.
This is definitely, by the way, the course TIESWEB will
follow in coming years.
I will conclude on this very question of 'conviction'.
In the past months, and until today every day on TV or
in newspapers, we can hear to comments praising 'leaders'
convictions' as if it had a value in itself. Hitler was
convinced he was right. Petain was convinced he was right.
Franco was convinced he was right. Chamberlain was convinced
he was right. Gengis Khan and Attila were most certainly
convinced that they were right. And so what?
One's conviction is not a proof of one's being right:
it is just saying that one has no doubt. It may come from
absolute knowledge (a pretty rare thing when you are not
God); or from a very human ability to ignore information
which may raise doubt.
In
any case, as a European, I would tend to think that not
to have doubts is a very specific feature, which fits
better to a religious leader than to a politician. Here
maybe is an entry to some more politically incorrect discussions
regarding future EU/US relations.
copyright
TIES
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