|
The U.S. is taking France and Germany seriously.
But what do they really seek?
|
by
Gary L. Geipel:
Chief Operating Officer, Hudson Institute
05/02/2003 |
 |
On
January 22, 2003, French President Jacques Chirac and German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder initiated a diplomatic conflict
with the United States that almost surely will lead to major
changes in the transatlantic relationship. It remains too
early to know exactly how transatlantic institutions and shared
goals will be reshaped - based on diverging political cultures
both within Europe and between Europe and the U.S. - but it
is too late to return to the status quo ante.
The
French and German statements two weeks ago on the 40th anniversary
of the Elysée Treaty concerned Iraq, but observers
of Europe in the U.S. believe that the significance of the
statements is much greater. Chancellor Schroeder declared
that his government would under no circumstances support a
UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force
against Iraq. President Chirac - while leaving himself slightly
more room for maneuver than Schroeder - made clear that he
sees no justification for forced regime change in Baghad.
The
initiation by Chancellor Schroeder and President Chirac of
this public break with the U.S. is being interpreted in dramatic
and far-reaching terms - precisely because there is no logical
explanation for a public break on the specific matter of Iraq.
Did
France and Germany initiate this break with the U.S. in order
to protect their own economic interests in Iraq or in the
wider Middle East? Surely not. The Middle East free of Saddam
Hussein almost certainly will be one in which the ability
of European countries to do business and to obtain reliable
oil supplies will be at least as secure as it is today.
Did
France and Germany initiate this break with the U.S. in order
to exempt their own military forces from engagement and possible
harm in a war with Iraq? Surely not. French and German support
for the U.S. position in the UN Security Council would in
no way require those countries to deploy their own forces
alongside the U.S.
Did
France and Germany initiate this break with the U.S. in order
to make a strong point about U.S. "unilateralism"
or a U.S. lack of respect for allied viewpoints? Surely not.
For months, U.S policy toward Iraq has shown enormous deference
to European preferences, grounding itself firmly in the resolutions
of the UN Security Council and allowing the process of inspections
another fair chance. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
reacted with particular disgust and surprise to the Franco-German
statements, since he has pushed successfully inside the U.S.
Government for a multilateral solution to the problem of Iraq.
Did
France and Germany initiate this break in order to defend
the common foreign policy of the European Union? Surely not.
As last week's letter from the leaders of eight other European
leaders makes clear, France and Germany do not represent a
consensus viewpoint or even a majority viewpoint among European
governments.
So
why, then, did France and Germany open this conflict? This
may be the most disturbing question to arise in the transatlantic
relationship since World War II.
In
the last two weeks - in the absence of clarification from
the Elysée Palace or the Chancellery - Americans have
freely offered their own answers to that question. The answer
provided by U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld - that
France and Germany constitute "old Europe" - received
the most attention and apparently caused the most anger in
Berlin and Paris. In fact, it is among the milder and more
benign answers being offered in the United States. Calling
the current French and German governments "old Europe"
is - in Secretary Rumsfeld's lexicon of bluntness - a fairly
good-natured way of expressing hope that younger and more
forward-thinking leaders will win the European debate. Here
are some of the other answers being offered in the U.S.:
Increasing
numbers of Americans now believe that the leaders of France
and Germany value the marginal, short-term domestic-political
benefits of anti-Americanism more than they value the enduring
benefits of transatlantic solidarity, and are therefore willing
to align themselves with loud activists in their own countries
who question any action undertaken by Washington.
Increasing
numbers of Americans now believe that France and Germany are
allies in a battle to control EU decision-making, using anti-Americanism
and various economic favors to forge a coalition of Brussels
apparatchiks and other political leaders opposed to more democratic
and diffused models of EU leadership.
Increasing
numbers of Americans now believe that France and Germany view
the Iraq conflict is the perfect opportunity to launch a European
foreign policy that "balances against" rather than
"coordinates with" U.S. foreign policy.
Increasing
numbers of Americans now believe that France and Germany do
not fear U.S. failure in Iraq as much as they fear U.S. success,
in so far as such success might strengthen U.S. and Israeli
influence in the Middle East to the detriment of the Arab
despots with which Europe seems most comfortable.
These
are not flattering interpretations of the Franco-German break
with the U.S., but they are interpretations that President
Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder need to acknowledge and to
address, if they are to avoid a permanent rupture in the transatlantic
alliance.
To
the great detriment of genuine transatlantic understanding,
the French and German political class spends far too much
time seeking comfort in the arms of Americans who share their
disdain for President George W. Bush and for any attitudes
or ideas that might emanate from his political party. The
reporters and editorial writers of the New York Times and
its ideological clones, the professors of America's elite
universities, the former officials of the Clinton Administration
who now populate transatlantic conferences, and, yes, the
U.S. diplomatic personnel who attend cocktail receptions in
Berlin, Brussels, and Paris, will gladly scoff at the "simple-minded
cowboy" who "stole the election," the "madman
Rumsfeld," or the supposed "unilateralist"
or "isolationist" motives that lurk behind any foreign
policy initiative of the Bush White House.
In
no other country in the world is the intellectual, diplomatic,
and media elite so unable to analyze or even to accurately
describe the views of large segments of its own population
as in the United States. The result of this situation is that
the veritable revolution in social policy that has occurred
in the U.S. during the last two decades, the true significance
of the rise in evangelical Christianity in America, and the
unusual optimism and confidence with which so many Americans
view their nation's global destiny - especially after September
11 - are distorted or virtually unknown outside U.S. borders.
It
has become a meaningless cliché to declare that we
share the same values across the Atlantic (and I write this
as someone who has used that cliché on many occasions).
Of course the U.S. and Europe still agree on the importance
of democracy, human rights, and national self-determination.
We agree on the need for tolerance of diverse political perspectives
and religions. We agree that genocide and the use of weapons
of mass destruction must be opposed. But do we still agree
on how to act on the basis of these values?
Statistically
speaking, the U.S. is a young nation. Americans still have
children. We welcome young immigrants, believing that they
will assimilate into our dominant culture rather than destroying
that culture. We continue to work, willingly, into our eighth
decade of life. We consider risk-taking a virtue, viewing
it as the only path to progress. Most Americans hold to powerful
religious beliefs and grasp with considerable sophistication
the dangers posed by unreformed and cloistered faiths. Taken
together as a people, we achieve an almost bizarre combination
of extreme passion for our own religious views and extreme
tolerance for the views of others. We are notorious "patriots,"
displaying great confidence in the appeal and endurance of
our system of government. As a nation, we see no contradiction
in working towards a just cause with ferocious violence and
tender compassion at the same time. Some have called this
"moral confidence."
How
many of the foregoing statements can be made about French,
German, or other western European societies? Is it any surprise
that our political leaders would reach very different conclusions
about what we can achieve in Iraq, the Middle East, and the
world - even while sharing a common set of liberal values?
It
is not about the oil. President Bush is on the verge of convincing
a majority of Americans not only that an international coalition
can destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and remove
Sadaam Hussein but also that a U.S.-led coaltiion can spread
an infection of democracy, liberalism, and peace in the Middle
East - starting with Afghanistan and Iraq. This idea is preposterous,
of course, absolutely crazy, almost certainly impossible.
Almost like achieving the peaceful collapse of communism and
the Soviet Union; German unification in NATO; a united Europe
free of war; the destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons;
the survival of a Jewish state; a technological shield against
the arrival of ballistic missiles; and the attachment of democracy
to societies as diverse as those of Chile, Formosa, India,
Southern Africa, and Turkey.
President
Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder may wish to review their comfortable
assumptions about America before abandoning President Bush
at the UN Security Council. After January 22, our relations
may never be quite the same. But France and Germany still
can prove wrong the many Americans who fear that the division
of the West is at hand, just as its hour has come.
copyright
TIES
|
