The transatlantic crisis is reality. And it has deepened with the differences of views over the question of attacking Iraq and changing the regime there. In Europe Iraq was for a long time not seen as the main aggressor and the main threat to the western world. And after all, the United States has failed to link Saddam Hussein to the attacks of September 11, 2001. So three main criticisms have been stated by the Europeans:

The post-war situation
Since the war in Iraq is almost over now the question to deal with mainly is the question of a new order in and for Iraq. The need to implement security, prosperity and good government is undisputed. This at first sight seems to be a perfect starting point for a renewal of transatlantic relations and for an overcoming of the deep rift between the two sides. Americans and Europeans could share the task of rebuilding Iraq - with the help of the Iraqi people and the international community, represented by the international organisations - and could thus base the relations on a clear-cut division of labour. But do the two partners want that? Is there still the will on both sides to mend the relationship? Or does the U.S. think it can do it alone whereas the Europeans think that their task lies in humanitarian aid and that's it?

Concerning the future of the transatlantic relationship, basically much will depend on the answers to three questions:

If the war could - in retrospective - be justified and if the Iraqi people mainly applauded the American presence in their country, this would be a completely different situation for the transatlantic partners than a situation in which no weapons were to be found and the Iraqi people mainly resented the presence of US soldiers. In the first case the European standing would be rather weak and the US could even further establish its role as the world's only superpower. In the latter case the US will probably be forced to return to a multilateral approach - including when it comes to the control of the Iraqi oil.
Overall, the war in Iraq is a defining event for the future of transatlantic relations that will trigger a variety of consequences that cannot be predicted today. One of them can be huge geopolitical consequences of a successful military outcome in Iraq: These consequences can be positive and they can also be negative in nature, meaning they can be understood as a new system of deterrence by rogue states, or the pre-emptive nature of the war provides a dangerous precedent for other states to use force to change what is considered to be a threatening regime. Another geopolitical consequence could be the triggering of counteraction by states like Russia - maybe together with some EU member states - or China to create a strong counterweight to such a strong superpower. Seen like that, this war would definitely not solve the transatlantic crisis but only make it worse by dividing Europe even further.

What can be done to reduce transatlantic tensions?
Europeans urgently need a strategic debate about their future role in world politics in general and about their approach to the transatlantic relationship in particular. The single European nation states have all lost their role as a world power a long time ago. But instead of compensating this loss by developing a European stance to foreign policy, they still act as nation states. Only if Europeans are willing to think as Europeans, the EU'S Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policy will have the relevance that is necessary for the EU to make an impact as an international actor.
As for Americans: The US needs to reconsider its role as hegemonic superpower. Even the US could - during the Iraq war - not have dealt with a second source of crisis if the situation n North Korea had gotten out of hands. It cannot be the world's policeman and free all countries from dictators. It does not have the money for it and will certainly loose the people's commitment to waging a similar preventive war against Iran and/or North Korea. So the country's course should be toward multilateral international planning and decision-making - as opposed to multilateral action with changing coalitions of the willing that only joined the party after it had already begun.

Under these two prerogatives, I still have this vision that transatlantic relations can be repaired, that the US and the EU still have a lot in common and share basis values and interests. It is now a question of political will and of communication abilities. Only if both sides understand the necessity to commonly meet the challenges of the future will this relationship survive. Otherwise the break will be there forever.