The
Iraq crisis served as magnifying glass, making visible fundamental
differences inside the EU and revealing the weaknesses of
its foreign policy making.
1.
Obviously there are differences among the member states
over basic principles in international relations. To name
just two: The use of force and Europe's relationship with
the US. Despite the Foreign Affairs Council's efforts to
define the use of force as a measure of last resort, the
interpretations of such a formula diverged greatly. The
fact that some member states supported the Iraq war - be
it actively or through logistical or political support -
while others opposed it, tells a story of its own. Similarly
in transatlantic relations: While for some Member States
one reason for siding with the US was to prevent a chasm
in the transatlantic alliance, others did not accept this
argument. There seem to be differing concepts of "the
West" prevailing in the minds of European leaders.
While some are willing to accept a unipolar West with the
US as the leading power; others would like to achieve a
bipolar West with the EU as a counterweight to America.
2.
It was additionally revealed that at times of crisis some
member states do not seem to be ready, nor willing, to create
common positions on such vital issues. Considerations of
domestic politics or national foreign policy strategy superseded
the quest for a common approach inside the CFSP-framework.
This fact hints at weaknesses in the Treaty provisions.
Obviously the common institutions did not seem to enjoy
the necessary respect among member states in order to be
considered as the prime means of consultation, and they
did not seem to have the means to convince member states
to use them as prime forums for consultation and decision-making.
This may be in part linked to the perception among the member
states, who feel that dealing with the crisis inside the
EU framework was too sluggish in order to keep the pace
with the sheer speed of events.
3.
The EU could not integrate its members, nor the accession
candidates into a wider European consensus. Although the
accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe are not
yet members of the Union, their stance in the Iraqi crisis
did matter, as it made the fracturing of Europe more evident.
In this regard the crisis provided a taste of the difficulties
of consensus-building and common decision making in CFSP
in an enlarged EU.
So,
if we take into account theses factors - has the Union become
weaker?
Currently
the EU's prestige appears weakened since its shortfalls
have surfaced. It has also become apparent that European
integration is not out of the woods in the field of CFSP.
There is the risk of a "roll-back" that could
make European foreign policy irrelevant.
Furthermore,
the credibility of the EU as a unified actor has been weakened.
The fact that member states made only scant use of the EU
framework in the crisis undermined their commitment of making
the Union a strong international actor. It neither increased
the acceptance of the CFSP's crisis management on Iraq in
the world nor among the citizens of the EU.
However,
these weaknesses do not necessarily have to continue into
the future. The history of European integration shows that
crises sometimes had a positive long-term effect. They can
create a momentum for change and trigger the willingness
among the member states and institutions to undertake reforms
in order to better prepare the Union for future crises.
Therefore,
CFSP/ESDP has entered a crucial stage. This coincides with
the Convention's proposals for a strengthening of CFSP and
ESDP, and the initiative on the part of Belgium, France,
Germany and Luxembourg to deepen integration in security
and defense policy.
Keeping
the EU's weaknesses in consideration, the future efforts
to strengthen the Union as a foreign policy actor should
center around the following aspects:
