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Miami 2002

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Speech: Nonie Valentine

The Transatlantic relationship as a precursor to Multilateral Co-operation

Indledning

Thank organisers for inviting!

A bit at odds with whether I should talk in personal capacity or as representative of my Government. Decided to give a more personal account, although limits. I hope and think you can be satisfied with that.

We are here in Miami to learn. One thing that I have been discovering during the last couple of days are the many possibilities, which people-to-people initiatives can provide. Approaches and viewpoints that for strategic, tactical and other reasons are not viable for Governments to pursue or even discuss, can at times more easily be taken up and dealt with on grass-roots level. Governments alone cannot alter the underlying dynamics of the system, which they themselves are part of. Often, impetus from the outside is needed to bring new life to processes that have been deadlocked. In that respect, by rising awareness and by formulating and organising sentiments that transcend national boundaries, NGOs and cross-boarder grass-roots initiatives have an essential role to play.

Transatlantiske forholds historiske betydning for multilateralt samarbejde

The establishment of the United Nations in October 1945 would probably not have been possible had it not been for the very nature of the relations and the co-operation across the North Atlantic as these had evolved since the first decades of the 20th century.

Historically, transatlantic co-operation has been the driving force in the establishment of the most important structures for global co-operation. The immediate forerunner to the ’Declaration by United Nations’ on 1 January 1942 was the so-called ’Atlantic Charter’ signed by Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941. The mere name of it suggests the strong Atlantic heritage of the UN. Going further back, the League of Nations – the real predecessor to the United Nations - was conceived in similar circumstances in the aftermath of World War I.

Also today, it is difficult to imagine any significant progress on multilateral co-operation unless both the European Union and the United States put their minds to it. The US is by far the largest military power in the world. And soon the EU will represent be biggest economy. Together, the US and the EU will represent close to half of the global economic output.

At the same time, we are growing closer economically by the day as pointed out by Joseph Quinlan in his report ‘Drifting apart or Growing together’. Quinlan demonstrates how mutual direct investments across the Atlantic during the 1990’s have created a common transatlantic economy and a degree of interdependence, which far surpasses what can be read out of trade figures. This underlines truth in the words of the European Security Strategy presented last year by the EU High Representative for foreign and security policy, Javier Solana: ‘The European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for the good in the world when acting together”.

Transatlantisk splittelse

Many of the problems facing us today are of a global character and they require more international action, not less. Climate change, poverty and trade issues and international terrorism. Globalization calls for more co-operation in a wide range of areas.

- områder
In light of Europe’s and America’s crucial role for the formation of the multilateral fora and the obvious need for more co-operation, it may seem as a paradox that over the past decade it has exactly been issues related to multilateral co-operation that have proven to be some of the most divisive between the United States and the European Union. There has been sharp disagreement on the Kyoto Protocol, The International Criminal Court, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the ABM Treaty. And recently, the Bush-administration pulled out of the Treaty banning anti-personnel mines. The pattern of these disagreements show an America, which – if not outright unilateralist – is clearly less multilaterally inclined than previously.

How do the United States and the EU – once again – commit themselves and apply their “formidable force for the good” on a more effective system of multilateral co-operation? What is it that keeps this from happening. And how can we get out of the present deadlock?

- årsager
9/11 not only changed the international agenda. 9/11 altered the fundamental parametres and conditions for international and multilateral co-operation. We are still grappling with how to act under these new circumstances. 9/11 triggered the finalisation of a process that started with the coming down of the Berlin wall in 1989, and which has now taken the international system from a state of bipolarity to unipolarity.

In the recent report from the Independent Task Force sponsored by the American Council on Foreign Relations - ‘Renewing the Atlantic Partnership’ it is argued that the series of disputes on especially the role of multilateral co-operation reflects disagreement on policy, not the utility of international institutions: In other words, had Americans and Europeans reached consensus on the issues involved, disputes over procedure would have been less serious. This seems to be a truism. After all, it is part of the very nature of multilateral co-operation to deal with issues for which bilateral agreements can not be found.

One can agree or disagree with Robert Kagan, but there is more explanatory power in his tenet that Europe and the US have conflicting structural interests in a strong framework for multilateral co-operation. Kagan’s point being that as the sole superpower, the US rejects multilateral co-operation as being restrictive. And that Europe – knowingly or not - is in favour of it for exactly the same reason.

In terms of military power the US is not only a primus inter pares as was the case – for instance – after World War II. The US has now become incredibly much stronger than any other power in the world. In the foreseeable future there will be no rival, no competitor to the US. The US military budget is close to reaching 50% of total military expenditure in the world. This change has greatly affected the prospects for strengthening broad international co-operation on a wide range of areas. The United States has become so strong that the need and case for it to enter binding multilateral co-operation has faded.

The back-bone reaction of many Europeans is that when the US avoids committing itself to multilateral cooperation, we will have less international order. However, many Americans, especially in the current administration, do not see it that way. On the contrary their analysis is that we – as allies – should be happy that the US is now freer and stronger because that makes the world a safer place. So it should not be the European friends that should worry – it is the rogue states and the terrorists.

In the words of Ole Wæver – a Danish political scientist who prepared a background paper for the a recent report of the Danish Defense Commission:

“[According to this view], the US should not only be the strongest and the dominating. Nor should they be only be very dominating. The US should be infinitely more dominating. The point being, that it should be so strong, that nobody would even dream of challenging it. That gives [according to this version of systems theory] an unusually peaceful system by eradicating the most dangerous dynamics that have led to war in other forms of polarity. I.e. rivalry between competing great powers and anxiety about smaller shifts in power balances.”

This passage underlines again that the shift in the foreign policy posture of the United States cannot merely be reduced to a question of the Bush administration. It runs deeper than that. It is a result of systemic dynamics. It has been on its way since the fall of the Berlin Wall. It has come to fruition during the Bush Administration and it is likely to continue in some form or another under future administrations.

But the different views of Europe and America on multilateral co-operation is not only a result of systems dynamics. For the European on the street, the question of multilateralism versus unilateralism is not a question of finding the means to balancing and binding other powers. It is a choice, often difficult, but necessary - almost a matter of survival. After all, the European Union itself is the no. 1 success story of multilateralism.

On May 1st – the day after tomorrow – the EU will welcome 10 new Member States and get to comprise 25 nations and 450 million inhabitants. It will become the world’s biggest economy. I am proud that the agreement behind this enlargement was negotiated during the term of the Danish presidency of the European Union in the latter half of 2002. With the enlargement, the EU has overcome two great schisms in Europe since World War II. First, it consolidated and deepened the bonds between those nations that had been warring each other during World War II. And now we have finally eradicated the dividing line that existed between Eastern and Western Europe during the cold war. These are great achievements. It should be underlined that without US support for this process, it would never have been possible. But what is important here is that for many Europeans, the benefits from multilateral co-operation are self-experienced and obvious. And vis-a-vis the challenges of global warming, non-proliferation and arms reduction appearing as a fundamental necessity.

The historical experience of the United States is different. A strong sense of self reliance shaped by the experience of the early settlers and life at the frontier runs deep. This is also reflected in the organization of the welfare and health care systems. And it is seen in the very liberal legislation and practice concerning sales and possession of guns in the US, which – in light of the high crime rates – is difficult to comprehend for most Europeans. Seen on this background, ceding sovereignty to an international entity or organisation is not exactly an easy political sell in the US.

To sum up a bit: One can find plausible explanations to the fundamentally different stands on multilateral cooperation between the US and the EU in both systems theory and in the respective history of the United States and Europe. What we have at play is maybe like an astronomic phenomenon where we are pulled apart by various independent forces.

Mellemøsten
The question of how to deal with Iraq and Saddam Hussein last year became the hitherto most contentious and divisive issue for the transatlantic relationship. In essence, what the clash in the Security Council boiled down to, has been described as a resistance on the part of especially France to accept the implications of the new unipolar world order. Many efforts will be made to avoid another public display of transatlantic differences as we saw them in the Security Council. But the underlying tensions are likely to stay.

After the stand-off in the Security Council over Iraq, it has been encouraging to see the efforts also to describe and recall for us the many positive aspects of the transatlantic relationship. It is important to keep in mind that in many instances, our controversies merely reflect the fact that we are close. After all, frictions are the result of being close. The value of the contested trade between the US and the EU amounts to only 1% of our total trade. As Quinlan points out, misjudging the true nature of the transatlantic relationship may come at a high prise.

The daily flow of news out of the Middle East Region testify to the general contention that the development in this region certainly has become one of the most pressing challenges we are facing today. One observer recently said that 80% of global security problems were now all somehow related to Middle East Region. After 9/11 many researchers, think-tanks and politicians have pointed to the social, economic, and political problems in the Middle East Region as areas that should become the new central focus for transatlantic co-operation, including on security, in the absence of the threat formerly posed by the Soviet Union.

Some of the constructive proposals on how to bring the transatlantic relationship out of its impasse have focused on the need for more cooperation on the Middle East Region. Former assistant secretary in the US State Department, Ronald Asmus, was among the first to point at the potential benefits from re-focussing transatlantic co-operation on this region. Also, the report of the independent task force under the Council on Foreign Relations proposes the building of a common approach to the Greater Middle East as a means of renewing the Atlantic Partnership.

The Bush administration has proposed a Greater Middle East initiative that would see the Mideastern and Northafrican regions engage in a process of political reform and economic development with the aim of removing those factors that are seen as root causes of terrorism, such as economic deprivation and political suppression. The European Union has been working on its own version of such an initiative – Wider Middle East. It is expected that the issue will be dealt with in more detail at the series of summits in June this year – the G8, the European Council, the EU-US Summit and the NATO-summit in Istanbul.

In this context, Denmark is together with Canada presently undertaking a mission throughout the region, including Israel, Turkey and Iran besides most Arab nations, to shape awareness of policymakers and civil society of the merits of a regional Security Charter. Reactions have so far varied but on the whole been quite encouraging.

Farer ved tilgangen
Any effort to seriously address the problems of the Middle Eastern region and to redirect the transatlantic relationship in a positive direction should of course be encouraged and supported. However, in the further discussion of ideas on how to give the transatlantic partnership a major role vis-a-vis the Middle East Region there should be given due consideration to the question of what will be the respective roles of and the division of labour between transatlantic undertakings on the one side and the United Nations on the other.

This discussion has bearings also on NATO’s current process of redefining itself as an out-of-area military organisation. NATO operations out of area are expected to become the order of the day soon. NATO is expected to take over operations in Afghanistan later this year, and many see it as only natural with a stronger role for NATO in Iraq in due time.

Launching transatlantic initiatives or operations vis-a-vis the Middle East Region and engaging for example NATO there, is not unproblematic: Active radical Moslem groups might see an interest in drawing the US and Europe into the conflicts as their adversaries – representing the West to them and many other Moslems, as we do. Also given the interest of some agents to depict the conflicts in the Greater Middle East as a battle between civilisations – by for instance actively blurring the differences between the international fight against terror and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – the transatlantic community should think twice before engaging in any undertaking related to peace-making/keeping or governance in the Middle East Region.

Behovet for FN og Universalitet
The very character of the problems in the Middle East calls for more co-operation through the United Nations. There is an inherent and essential question of legitimacy, which can only be addressed by involving the United Nations more. This also seems to be dawning on the Bush administration these days. On the same note, we should also keep in mind that the more we emphasise democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights as values characterising and distinguishing the transatlantic community – as has been a tendency after 9/11 - the more difficulties are we going to have in promoting the same values as universal values in – for instance – the Middle East. Here again, we need something more general and overarching like the United Nations in order not to lose credibility.

While there are many factors speaking in favour of more co-operation in the United Nations it has to be admitted that there are few signs that this is going to happen anytime soon. As mentioned before, the dynamics of the unipolar system seem to be pulling in the opposite direction. Also, the UN is in need of major reforms, in particular the Security Council and its outdated structure and permanent membership reflecting the political status quo after the second world war and not present day realities. A UN Working Group dealing with reform of the Security Council was established 11 years ago but has not been able to agree on any substantial proposals. The situation seems deadlocked because of conflicting national interests.

So again, we find our nations in a situation where they are incapable of reaching agreement on a new composition of the Security Council, which everybody agrees is completely outdated.

Afslutning
There seems to be a growing conflict between the present dynamics of the international system and the actual need for broad participation in international cooperation vis-a-vis the global challenges that we are facing. I think it will become increasingly evident for people that we need to strengthen the kind of co-operation, which the United Nations was intended for. I think NGOs and grass-roots movements have an important role in mobilising the awareness and the pressure on governments to accept the necessary kind of international multilateral co-operation.