Transatlantic Week Miami 2004

It is my strong conviction that we - Europeans and Americans - share common ground. It is our historic mission to invest in that common ground and in better understanding each other.

The ‘nine – eleven’ attacks on New York and Washington were not just attacks on America. At the time they were felt as attacks on the West as a whole. Even the French newspaper Le Monde wrote in capital letters: "Nous sommes tous des Americains!" (We are all Americans!) The attacks on the Twin Towers laid bare what was - technically speaking - called 'Ground Zero'. Since that shocking event, are we not all of us in fact seeking a Common Ground Zero?

(By the way: the institutions that sought common ground very effectively in the very first hours and days after the nine-eleven disaster were the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank. Too few people realise of what great value this transatlantic monetary hotline has been in preventing the world-wide financial system to collapse completely.)

So, what about common ground zero?
Europe and North America have a strong common (spiritual) heritage: Europeans, like Americans - although in different ways - see themselves as children of the Enlightenment.

A few features stand out. One of them is the way we view the rights of the individual as distinguished from the rights of the collective and the fundamental belief that these rights are not geographically limited to the Atlantic area. The claim that human rights are universal constitutes a strong foundation of common ground. The great Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant defined the concept of ‘man’, of 'humanity' in moral terms, which cannot be reduced to the empirical meanings of race, biology and so forth. It was a big (mental) step for mankind, although really practising it took at least 200 years. The philosopher was European, but the ones to first put it into practice were America’s Founding Fathers.

Another fundamental feature of the transatlantic relationship is the culture of the separation of powers. The American Founding Fathers were inspired to build the separation of powers into the Constitution because of - to quote one of them - "their fear of the infinite capacity of the human heart to fool itself!" unquote. This – by the way - could easily have been said by a Calvinist-protestant Dutchman!

Related values are the way we share the freedom of speech and of religion. After the American example, most European countries anchored these values in their constitutions.

I could easily continue my summing-up of enlightened principles we share and bore you with it. Yet, despite these common roots in values, Americans and Europeans do still seem to approach these values in different - sometimes - very different ways. Moreover, we may also differ over the question how to export these values to other regions. One wonders if Americans and Europeans are not divided by the very values they share!

That looks like an ironic - if not tragic - observation. But we should not be misled, nor discouraged by it. It should motivate us to go the extra mile in understanding each other and each others histories, including the asymmetry of power and of strategic culture and in the end the ensuing differences of American and European 'discourse'.

Take he theme of religion in our societies. We observe that the separation of Church and State the principle is deeply rooted in both the US and in Europe. Nevertheless there are considerable differences in how the principle is applied. Europeans have great difficulty understanding an American notion like 'God's own country' and the way some American politicians call on God when dealing with quite ‘earthly’ matters. This would be unheard of in Europe, even for politicians from Christian political parties. The puritan sense of idealism and accomplishment, and even of a political 'mission' that goes with it is quite alien to Europeans.

(This being said, quite a few Europeans - by increasingly meeting active European Muslimbelievers - are confronted with the pre secular roots of their secular ways of life. This has given new life to the question whether the (constitutional) identity of Europe has to do with Judeo Christianity or not. )

Where Europeans have difficulty in understanding the American tendency to mix political and religious discourse, who – on the other hand - can really understand the fact that Great Britain has a Head of State who is Head of the Church of England as well? Certainly no Americans can. Both the EU and the US are full of such symbols and traditions mostly leading to, in itself, interesting and harmless stereotypes. Nevertheless we must be conscious of their potential to divide us, especially where differences do matter, as is the case with differing legal procedures.

But when we stress differences between us, let us not forget about the political and cultural differences within Europe, and within America! Europe and America have complex and open societies, full of differing opinions, filled with intellectual and political debates. Some Europeans feel more familiar with North Americans than with Europeans in other parts of Europe, and many Americans, for instance feel much more at ease with a – what they consider – ‘European’ look on matters. (Not all Americans are from Mars, many like Venus a lot more, and vice versa!)

The cornerstone of our societies however, is the ability to make agreements to disagree (or rather: to have the structures or institutions that make it possible to disagree). That's where civilisation, where a mature partnership, begins. That's where the Atlantic’s common ground zero should begin.

America and Europe are much more intertwined than is often realised.
For many Europeans, America has been, and still is, a point of reference, if not at times, an obsession. The famous German thinker and poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe – living some 200 years ago - never visited America himself, but he did read Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence. If Jefferson’s project succeeded - he concluded - America would become the true Europe. As to Goethe’s prophesy: America has become America and not the 'true Europe'. In fact it was Alexis de Tocqueville - a lucid Frenchman - who had the right intuitions during his American Grand Tour. In the 1830's he went to America in order to understand what Europe might become at a later stage of its history: quote:" I wanted to get to know democracy, in order to know what we might hope or fear from her!" unquote. For good old Goethe, America was a 'greater Europe', for Tocqueville America was more like a future image of Europe.

It was indeed constitutional democracy that spread from the United States to Europe! It was like a return on the investment of European thought and values that were transplanted to North America in the centuries before.

And what about Europe itself? After the devastation of the two World Wars, Europe was dangerously balancing on a moral, political and economic abyss. In some ways one may compare the 1914 -1945 period with the American Civil War (in some others not). Many of Europe’s finest minds managed to escape to the United States in the 1930s, in the hope that there they could contribute to the preservation and furtherance of the best that European civilisation had to offer.

The first attempts of European integration started with courageous moves by the old archenemies France and Germany. They decided to transfer the management of their steel and coal industries to a European Authority. That triggered a process of growth - at times spectacular, at times coming to a halt - into more sophisticated forms of common policies, of what we call 'sharing sovereignty'. The number of participating member states grew from 6 to 15 and tomorrow, the first of May we grow to 25, finally reuniting our old continent!

But the integration process of Europe might never have happened without America’s help, without the prophetic vision of American Statesmen. It started with Roosevelt’s 'Europe first' policy of 1941 continuing after the war with the so-called Marshall Plan, not to forget the mantle of the US security guarantee.

As the integration process began to have more political and economic impact - the introduction of the Euro, the start of a Common Security and Defence Policies, etc. - of course America's national interest also led to a certain American ambivalence about the EU.

I once heard an American diplomat in Europe say that it felt as if the US was about the only country not being a candidate member for the European Union. Well, his subtle sense of humour can be appreciated, but the US has always been a player in the European integration process, not only - at the start. It became a big investor in the internal European market, it has an interest in a stable and free Europe, and it has a stake in Europe's security. And the US is in a way what I call an external federator. By externally challenging Europe, it stimulates Europe's internal integration. Kissingers famous question - “What telephone number to call to speak to Mr Europe” - was such an external ‘federator’. We had many telephone numbers, as many as there where member states. These days the EU has one number to call from overseas. It is Mr Solana’s, the EU's ‘kind-of-Secretary of State’. But - to be honest – of course he is not a Colin Powell yet. And, of course, there are still quite a few European numbers more to call when Washington’s interests so demand. And we Europeans then have to prevent being played against each other.

During this week’s seminar this, some speakers suggested that ‘nine-eleven’ and the Iraq crisis also functioned as external federators for Europe. I think they are right.

Despite strong American involvement in Europe, many Americans - politicians more than businesspeople - have a tendency to look at the EU 'outside in', rather than 'inside out'. They look at the external strategic dimensions, like the (external) effects of enlargement, such as the EU relationship with Turkey and of course the development of a European Foreign and Defence policy.

It is indeed difficult to understand the internal dynamics of the EU from the outside. It is even harder to understand how member states experience the permanent interaction between Brussels’ institutions and theirs. Nevertheless, it is exactly that process that resulted in a big internal market with one currency, common police and justice policies, and the beginning of a common foreign and defence policy, with tremendous internal as well as external consequences, economically, politically and psychologically.

That is the good news. The bad news is that because of the very complex enlargement process, the EU has less time and energy to organise effective external action. Many external partners regard the EU to be inward looking. I trust this is a temporary problem, because the European record for being outward looking, for 'soft security' policy in terms of multilateralism, trade, global environment and development assistance, is strong in itself. The member states themselves have active external policies, being the biggest aid donor’s world- wide. Moreover, under Mr Solana's leadership the EU has produced it's first (Common) Security Strategy Paper, which has not gone unnoticed in Washington. I note that this was not done to contrast with the US. It was done to seek common ground.

The very bad news is that ordinary European people - who have the formal right of European citizenship – still identify themselves primarily with their own national state, and too little with the EU itself. Quite a few are indifferent towards their European Parliament, and their representatives in that parliament. Brussels does not provide a visible political arena, like Washington does. European politicians as such are relatively anonymous. The problem of the EU has to do with a lack of ownership. Firstly, people mostly take the gains of integration for granted. Secondly, national governments do not give Brussels (the EU) the credit for what it does. They tend to blame Brussels for impopular decisions that in fact they themselves as members of the EU Council are co responsible for. Thirdly, it is a matter of failing education, of failing to educate our younger generation to become true citizens of Europe.

I will not go into the question how - in such an unfavourable political context - one can still produce a constitution, or rather a constitutional treaty that subsequently needs ratification by 25 member states. That is what we are attempting to do right now and in the month’s to come. And don't ask me who are our Madison’s or our Hamilton’s, they are quite invisible to the European public, although admittedly Giscard d’Estaing – the Constitutional Convention’s president - did present an impressive draft constitution. I hope that I can bring you our Federal Papers by next year! Do not forget that forging a Constitution these days for our complex societies, is a lot more complicated than it was at the end of the 18 th century for White Anglo Saxon Protestant - America!

The hopeful sign for Europe - though - is that the younger generation tends to be much more pragmatic with respect to Europe and to European solutions for transnational problems. I hope they will be equally open in seeking transatlantic common ground for transatlantic challenges. During this seminar I have been convinced that the bottom up work of civil society networks like ties-web has great potential in this respect.

We need those signs of hope. The challenges before us are immense. Speaking only from a European perspective, I feel that the lack of public support for the European project is not just a matter of indifference. In a way many Europeans – both consciously and unconsciously – feel the need for change, for transformation. But, at the same time – in watching America today - they tend to ask the sort of questions Tocqueville did in his days. Will America’s society be our future? What is it we may hope or fear from her? Will something like a European model of society – with its notion of social cohesion - still exist in 20 years time? Will the four freedoms of our internal market inevitably lead to American ways of life, to the problems of America’s society? To what extent is European ‘protection’ against forces of globalisation acceptable? What mix between the individual and the social dimensions of Europe is sustainable?

I am convinced that a transatlantic dialogue is necessary more than ever. Let me quote Netherlands minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Bot, in a recent speech. Quote: The question of the transatlantic relationship forms part and parcel of an even more significant one: how can Europe, America and other important partners contribute to a more stable, secure and peaceful world? The international agenda forces us to work together. It is not a mere option but an inescapable necessity. Those Europeans who believe that our future will go down paths separate from those of the United States are well advised to bear in mind that in maintaining the multilateral system, the United States is indispensable.

When circumstances demand, the European Union must not shrink from supplementing soft power with hard power. At the same time the United States should give soft power the credit it deserves. Both are needed if peace and stability are to be maintained in the long run. Unquote.

Let us continue to seek Transatlantic Common Ground with an open mind for the world at large.
Thank you.